Understanding Others: The Person Model Theory

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How do we make sense of the behaviour of other people? After a short criticism of Theory-Theory and Simulation Theory (as well as Interaction Theory and the Narrative Theory), I develop an alternative approach: the Person Model Theory. Person Models are the basis for our ability to register and evaluate behaviour. I argue that there are two kinds of person models we rely on, nonconceptual person schemata and conceptual person images (and both kinds are developed for groups like managers, homeless people, students, and for individuals, the own mother, sister, spouse, the best friend, etc.). It will be argued that Person Models are a real alternative to the accounts we have up to now.

References:

• Newen & T. Schlicht (2009). Understanding other minds: a criticism of Goldman's simulation theory and outline of the person model theory. *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 79, 209-242.

Folk Psychology: Sticking to the High Road

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Very young infants possess impressive mind minding abilities – this is clearly demonstrated by recent experimental research. What is not clear is how best to characterize these capacities. In this short presentation, focusing on the issue of mental content, I briefly raise a fundamental theoretical concern about attempts to understand the basis of such capacities in high level cognitivist terms, i.e. by attributing children some or other sort of 'theory of mind' capacity. Over and against this, commenting on emerging empirical data, I defend the possibility that we start out with non-representational capacities for engaging with other minds and only gradually develop our folk psychological competence by engaging with communal artifacts – stories with special properties – in our shared storytelling practices. It is by this means that we gradually acquire our articulate capacity for making sense of ourselves and others in terms of reasons.

References:

• http://herts.academia.edu/DanielDHutto